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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 




This court should not adopt a per se rule that Miranda warnings are never 
necessary when an attorney is present at an accused's custodial interrogation. 
MIRANDA WARNINGS ARE ALWAYS REQUIRED. 
The state urges this court to adopt a per se rule that the warnings required by 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) need not be given when an accused is 
represented by counsel during custodial interrogation. Any such rule would violate 
precedent established by Miranda, and reaffirmed by Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428 (2000). The state, in effect, urges this court to adopt a totality of the 
circumstances test focusing on voluntariness as the key to a statement's admissibility 
when Miranda warnings are not given. In Dickerson, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected 
precisely this approach. Infra, § A. Section B addresses the authority offered by the state 
as support for this drastic departure from established precedent. 
First, however, the state's concessions are significant. The state does not contest 
that the statement at issue was given in the course of custodial interrogation. Regarding 
the trial court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law (R. 115), the state does not 
contest that the following factual findings are clearly erroneous: «f 5 (finding that Mr. 
Vos was read Miranda warnings when he was arrested); and \ 14 (finding that Mr. Vos's 
attorney "ensured that Vos' Miranda rights were waived"). R. 116, 117. Nor does the 
state contest that the so-called findings set forth in ^[ 10, 12 and 13 are, in fact, 
conclusions of law; and that these conclusions effectively mimic the conclusions set forth 
in ffif 1 and 2 of the actual conclusions. R. 117, 118.1 
These concessions greatly simplify the two legal issues addressed herein. Does an 
attorney's presence automatically render voluntary, and thus admissible, an un-warned 
statement? May the actual warnings themselves be waived by the attorney, and lead to a 
valid waiver of those unwarned rights? 
A. Dickerson Effectively Requires that Warnings Be Given Even when Counsel 
Is Present 
The Supreme Court, in Dickerson, invalidated congressional legislation that 
sought to base the admissibility of a self-incriminating statement not upon whether 
warnings were given and rights were waived, but rather upon the totality of 
circumstances relating to the voluntariness of said confession. 530 U.S. at 431-32. Yet 
this totality of the circumstances analysis is what Utah asks this court to adopt. 
1
 The state suggests that Mr. Vos failed to marshal the evidence in his argument that fact 
paragraph 11 (finding that giving the statement was part of a "cogent and joint strategy") 
is clearly erroneous. In fact, Mr. Vos's brief, at 8-9, details Mr. Vos's pre-statement 
interactions with his attorney, and thus any so-called strategizing that may have occurred. 
2 
To appreciate the relevance of Dickerson to the case on review, the following must 
be understood: The distinction between the self-incrimination warning requirement and 
any subsequent waiver of right; the reasoning and holding of Miranda; the statute (18 
U.S.C. § 3501 (1990)) at issue in Dickerson; and, Dickerson itself. Infra, §§ 1-4. 
Against this backdrop, § 5 addresses the state's argument that a totality of the 
circumstances test may suffice in the absence of Miranda warnings. 
I Warnings and Subsequent Waivers. The state argues that any statement 
made in counsel's presence is voluntary and thus admissible. This argument ignores the 
two-prong admissibility requirement that (a) a defendant must be informed about his right 
against self-incrimination, and (b) any subsequent waiver of this right be voluntary, 
knowing and intelligent. 
A confession is admissible only if the defendant received the four warnings 
identifying the rights to counsel and against self-incrimination, and only then if any 
subsequent waiver of rights is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Miranda, 384 U.S. 
479 ("But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution 
at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him"). 
Regarding the waiver, the prosecution "bears a heavy burden to establish not only that 
defendant understood his constitutional rights, but that he voluntarily elected to waive 
them." State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1986). Significantly, "'the defendant is 
given the benefit of every reasonable presumption against such a waiver.'" State v. 
2
 While Mr. Vos's opening brief, at 42-48, discusses Dickerson, the state's response does 
not once mention Dickerson. 
3 
Streeter, 900 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quoting State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 
1208, 1211 (Utah 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988)).3 Any argument that 
ignores the distinction between warnings and waiver fails as a matter of law. 
2. Miranda. Reviewing three key holdings from Miranda is important to both 
understand the significance of Dickerson, and evaluate the validity of the state's totality-
of-circumstances argument. 
a. In Miranda, the Court found that compulsion to incriminate oneself is inherent 
during custodial interrogation. E.g., 384 U.S. at 457 n.26 (observing the "absurdity of 
denying that a confession obtained under these circumstances is compelled"), 467 (noting 
that custodial interrogation inflicts "inherently compelling pressures which work to 
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not 
otherwise do so freely"). The Court rejects the state's argument herein that the Miranda 
warnings are something less than mandatory in the apparent absence of coercion: 
Because custodial police interrogation, by its very nature, isolates and 
pressures the individual, we stated that "[e]ven without employing brutality, 
the 'third degree' or [other] specific stratagems,. . . custodial interrogation 
exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of 
individuals." 
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435 (alteration in original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455).4 
3
 Voluntariness is only one of the three components of a valid, post-warning, waiver of 
rights. Such a waiver must also be knowingly and intelligently given. All three 
components are addressed in Mr. Vos's opening brief, at pp. 42-46. 
4
 The state mistakenly asserts that a process that minimizes overt coercion assures 
voluntariness, and thus does away with the need for the Miranda warnings. Br. Appellee, 
at 37-38. This is precisely what was argued to the Court in Dickerson - and squarely 
rejected. For example, then-Professor Paul Cassel, appointed amicus by the Dickerson 
Court because neither party would defend the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, 
4 
b. The Miranda Court held that all four warnings must be given; it did not suggest 
that observing one of the rights embodied by the four warnings might suffice for failing 
to warn about the other three. 384 U.S. at 444 (forbidding use of statements rendered 
during custodial interrogation unless the accused is "warned that he has a right to remain 
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he 
has a right to the presence of an attorney.. . ."), 478-79 (requiring the provision of all 
four warnings); accord Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442 (rejecting any sort of totality of the 
circumstances test, in lieu of the specific warnings, to determine voluntariness) (citing 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457, 467, 490-91). In particular, the warning that anything the 
accused says can be used at trial is one of the "absolute prerequisite^] to interrogation.'5 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471. 
c. The Miranda Court hypothesized that systematic procedures established 
through legislation might provide enough protection against compelled confessions that 
the warnings would no longer be mandatory. 
The Court summarized its holdings at the beginning of the opinion, noting that 
they would be "spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow. . . ." Id., 384 
argued that voluntariness, and thus admissibility, should hinge upon actual coercion, not 
upon whether the warnings were given. Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Urging 
Affirmance of the Judgment Below (Mar. 9, 2000) at 13 (arguing that § 3501 represents 
congressional intent that the trial court decide voluntariness based upon factors in 
addition to whether warnings were given), 29 (Fifth Amendment prohibits police from 
"forcing," not "causing" a statement; and divining the difference turns upon more than 
merely whether warnings were given); 40 ("Irrebuttable presumption" that unwarned 
statements are involuntary should be abolished), 41-42 (no reason to believe unwarned 
statements are involuntary). Compare Dicker son, 530 U.S. at 435 (quoting Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 455, and affirming its conclusion that custodial interrogation is inherently 
coercive even without evidence of overreaching). 
5 
U.S. at 444. In arguing that the fortuitous presence of counsel constitutes an effective 
alternative to the giving of all four warnings and a subsequent waiver of rights, the state 
quotes a portion of the introductory paragraph in which the Court holds the prosecution 
must provide the warnings "unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards 
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Id. The Court later states 
that any such alternative must include actual "procedural safeguards," id., developed by 
Congress and the states - not happenstance. Id. at 467 ("We encourage Congress and the 
States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the 
rights of the individual. . . ."), 490 ("Congress and the States are free to develop their own 
safeguards for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective.. . ."). The Court 
further clarified that Miranda's invitation to develop alternatives requires actual 
legislative action, noting "[The] Miranda Court's invitation for legislative action to 
protect the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination." Dickerson, 530 U.S. 
at 440 (emphasis added); see also id. ("the Constitution would not preclude legislative 
solutions that differed from the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were cat least as 
effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence. . . .'" (quoting Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 467)). 
Moreover, the Miranda Court repeatedly emphasized that any such alternative 
guarantee the accused at least as much protection against self-incrimination as the four 
warnings provide. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ("other fully effective means"), 467 ("at 
least as effective"), 476 ("fully effective equivalent"), 479 ("other fully effective 
means"), 490 (alternatives must be "fully as effective as those described above"). 
3, 18 U.S.C. § 3501. This discussion of § 3501 is relevant to understanding 
Dickerson's rejection of the totality-of-circumstances test the state urges this court to 
adopt. Section 3501 provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the 
District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall 
be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is 
received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, 
determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the 
confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the 
trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of 
voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the 
confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances. 
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into 
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, 
including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the 
defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before 
arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with 
which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making 
the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that 
he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement 
could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been 
advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) 
whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when 
questioned and when giving such confession. 
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken 
into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of 
voluntariness of the confession. 
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1990) (emphasis added). 
Thus § 3501 decreed that a voluntary statement was admissible, and authorized a 
totality-of-circumstances analysis to determine voluntariness. It identified receipt of the 
Miranda warnings - as well as the assistance of counsel - as possible indications of 
7 
voluntariness. However, § 3501 abolished the warnings, and a voluntary, knowing and 
intelligent waiver of self-incrimination, as absolute prerequisites to admissibility. 
Section 3501(b)(5) (emphasized above) pertains to this case because the state 
argues that the assistance of counsel ameliorates any requirement for Miranda warnings. 
4. Dickerson. In Dicker son, the Court found § 3501 unconstitutional because its 
totality-of-circumstances test to determine voluntariness impermissibly eliminated the 
requirements that the warnings be given, and a valid waiver of rights obtained, as 
conditions for admissibility. The Dickerson Court held that Miranda was a 
"constitutional decision." Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. As such, legislation may not 
diminish the protections against self-incrimination - specifically the four warnings: 
In Miranda . . . we held that certain warnings must be given before a 
suspect's statement made during custodial interrogation could be admitted in 
evidence. In the wake of that decision, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501, 
which in essence laid down a rule that the admissibility of such statements 
should turn only on whether or not they were voluntarily made. We hold 
that Miranda, being a constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in 
effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we decline to overrule Miranda 
ourselves. We therefore hold that Miranda and its progeny in this Court 
govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation 
in both state and federal courts. 
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431-32. 
This is how the case reached the Supreme Court. The defendant sought to 
suppress a confession in the trial court. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th Cir. 1999). 
While the trial court found the confession voluntarily given, it granted the suppression 
motion because the defendant did not receive the Miranda warnings prior to interrogation. 
Id. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that § 3501 effectively overruled Miranda 
8 
and, therefore, the trial court's holding as to actual voluntariness compelled admission of 
the confession. Id. at 692-93. 
In reversing the appeals court, the Supreme Court found that § 3501 based a 
statement's admissibility solely upon voluntariness. Id. at 432. Section 3501 posited a 
"totality-of-the-circumstances" analysis for determining voluntariness. Id. at 437. 
The Court noted that Miranda intended to " 'give concrete constitutional guidelines 
for law enforcement agencies to follow.'" Dicker son, 530 U.S. at 439 (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42). Further emphasizing the mandatory 
nature of the Miranda warnings, the Dicker son Court declared: "'The requirement of 
warnings and waiver of rights is . . . fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment 
privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.'" Id. at 
440 n.4 (alteration in original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476). 
Precisely because Miranda created a rule of constitutional magnitude, any valid 
legislative alternative to the warnings must guarantee as much protection as do the 
warnings themselves. Dicker son at 440 ("the Constitution would not preclude legislative 
solutions that differed from the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were 'at least as 
effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence . . . . ' " (quoting Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 467)). 
Court-invited amicus argued that § 3501 provided as much protection to Fifth 
Amendment rights as the Miranda warnings; and, especially when combined with 
additional civil remedies now available to challenge police abuse, § 3501 provides even 
more protection. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441-42. The Court disagreed, holding: 
9 
[Section] 3501 explicitly eschews a requirement of preinterrogation 
warnings in favor of an approach that looks to the administration of such 
warnings as only one factor in determining the voluntariness of a suspect's 
confession. The additional remedies cited by amicus do not, in our view, 
render them, together with § 3501, an adequate substitute for the warnings 
required by Miranda. 
Id. at 442. Thus the Court held that even a concededly voluntary statement remains 
inadmissible unless the warnings are first given, and the rights voluntarily waived. 
5. Dickerson Applied. Both Miranda and Dickerson undermine the state's 
argument in favor of a per se rule excusing a failure to provide the Miranda warnings 
when the accused is represented by counsel. Five reasons for rejecting the state's 
argument are discussed below. 
First, the warnings - all four of them - are mandatory absent a legislatively created 
systemic alternative that is at least as effective at informing the accused of Fifth 
Amendment rights as are the warnings. E.g., Dickerson at 440. At most, Mr. Vos was 
apprised of his right to remain silent. R. 259:15-16. He was not warned that anything he 
said could be used against him at trial or otherwise. R. 259:34. He was not told that if he 
could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed at no expense.5 Because a valid 
5
 In Miranda, the court acknowledged that the warning about an indigent person's right to 
appointed counsel is of little benefit to one who has an attorney, or "is known to have 
ample funds." Miranda, 483 U.S. at 473 n.43. The Court, however, declared that 
because this warning is so easily given, and the rights involved too important to leave to 
haphazard inquiries about financial resources, the warning must be given. Id. & n.43. 
Mr. Bucher was retained by Mr. Vos's family. R. 259:20-21. Mr. Vos was a student. 
See R. 261:195. Mr. Bucher and Mr. Vos most certainly disagreed about whether Mr. 
Vos should give a statement. E.g., R. 259:24 (Mr. Bucher conceding that he had never 
discussed in detail what any statement by Mr. Vos might include), 32 (Mr. Vos testifying 
that Mr. Bucher had never before discussed making a statement that detailed Mr. Vos's 
involvement in the shooting), 33 (Mr. Vos expressing surprise and confusion when 
in 
waiver is predicated on the warnings being provided and understood (e.g., Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 476 (describing "warnings and waiver" as "fundamental," and "not simply a 
preliminary ritual"), 479 ("But unless and until such warnings and waiver are 
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation 
can be used against him")), Mr. Vos simply could not have validly waived rights of which 
he was never informed. 
Second, the state's argument that an attorney's presence obviates any need for the 
warnings embodies nothing more or less than a totality of the circumstances analysis 
focusing on voluntariness, which the Dickerson Court soundly rejected. E.g., 530 U.S. at 
442-43. The state argues that the presence of an attorney lessens the risk of coercion. 
Thus, its argument proceeds, the statement made in an attorney's presence must be 
voluntary and, therefore, admissible. However, both the self-incrimination warnings and 
a subsequent voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of rights are absolute requisites to 
a statement's admissibility. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476, 479. Absent the warnings, 
circumstantial evidence of voluntariness alone will not suffice: "The Fifth Amendment 
privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of 
giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not 
pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without 
confronted by Mr. Bucher and the detective), id. (Mr. Vos not wanting to make a 
statement), id. (Mr. Vos initially refusing to give a statement), 27 (Mr. Bucher dismissing 
Mr. Vos's hesitancy to make a statement as mere naivete), 33 (Mr. Bucher "kept insisting 
and kept insisting" that Mr. Vos give a statement). Based upon this conflict, Mr. 
Bucher's ineffective assistance (detailed in Mr. Vos's opening brief), and Mr. Vos's 
apparent indigence, such a warning would have informed Mr. Vos of a vital - and 
relevant - constitutional right. 
l l 
a warning being given." Id. at 468; see also id. at 469 ("[W]hatever the background of 
the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to 
overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the 
privilege at that point in time"). Even where an attorney is the accused, the warnings are 
mandatory. E.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) ("The fact that Glasser 
is an attorney is, of course, immaterial to a consideration of his right to the protection of 
the Sixth Amendment"), superseded on other grounds by rule as acknowledged in 
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987); State v. Stein, 360 A.2d 347, 358 
(N.J. 1976) ("Moreover, it goes without saying that the fact that defendant was himself a 
lawyer does not derogate from his right of counsel and to complain of unconstitutional 
impairment or deprivation of that right").6 Thus Dicker son and Miranda prohibit 
consideration of an attorney's presence in determining voluntariness and, thus, 
admissibility, when warnings are not given. 
Third, absent unusual circumstances, an attorney may not waive self-incrimination 
rights on a client's behalf. "By its very nature, the privilege [against self-incrimination] is 
an intimate and personal one. It respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and 
thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation." Couch v. United 
States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 n.8 (noting in dicta 
that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination "is a purely personal right"). 
6
 By contrast, determining the validity of a waiver given subsequent to the warnings does 
permit examination of the totality of the circumstances. E.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 
(noting that circumstances such as the length of interrogation, the accused's ability to 
communicate with others, and tactics employed by the prosecution in eliciting the 
statement are relevant to whether a post-warning waiver of rights is voluntary). 
10 
This is why, absent unusual circumstances, an attorney may not validly invoke the right to 
remain silent on behalf of a client. "Only the appellants, not their counsel, are the proper 
parties to interpose a claim of privilege personal to themselves to prevent compelled 
disclosures that appellants 'reasonably believe ( ) could be used (against them) in a 
criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used."' United 
States v. Schmidt, 816 F.2d 1477, 1481 n.3 (10th Cir. 1987) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1973)); accord State v. Southland 
Corp., 684 F.Supp. 292, 294-95 & n.3 (S.D. Fla. 1988). "[Compelling circumstance[s]" 
that permit counsel to invoke the right against self-incrimination on behalf of a client 
might include the client's "physical incapacity, illness and the like." Id. at 295 nn.4, 5. 
If an attorney may not invoke Fifth Amendment rights on behalf of a client, 
certainly an attorney may not waive those rights on behalf of a client. After all, the 
starting point is that the accused is cloaked with those rights. It is presumed an 
incriminating statement disclosed during interrogation is inadmissible unless the 
disclosure follows the warnings and a valid waiver. An attorney invoking such rights is 
merely reinforcing the status quo. An attorney purporting to waive those rights is 
stripping away a client's fundamental constitutional protections. If the former is 
impermissible, then so must be the latter. 
Mr. Vos did not personally waive any Fifth Amendment right before detailing his 
involvement. R. 259:15-16 (the detective who interrogated Mr. Vos testifies that Mr. 
Bucher purported to waive Mr. Vos's right to remain silent). No compelling 
circumstance prevented the detective from providing all four warnings, and, were he 
13 
inclined to do so, ensuring that Mr. Vos's waiver was personally, voluntarily, knowingly, 
and intelligently given. 
Fourth, § 3501(b)(5) included the assistance of counsel during interrogation among 
the nonexclusive list of factors relevant to voluntariness. Even though § 3501 combined 
an attorney's involvement with other prophylactic factors within the statute - and beyond 
the statute - the Supreme Court held that § 3501 simply did not provide the same level of 
protection as do the clear and definite Miranda warnings. Dicker son, 530 U.S. at 441-42. 
Yet, in this case, the state argues that the presence of counsel - and nothing more - is 
sufficient protection to render the warnings superfluous. If counsel's involvement and 
additional protections are not enough, then neither is the presence of counsel absent any 
other protections. 
Fifth, the state attempts to qualify the serendipitous presence of counsel as a fully 
effective equivalent to the warnings that the Miranda Court invited states and Congress 
to create. However, the Court has made clear that any such alternative should be 
systemic and legislative in nature. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440 (noting the "Miranda 
Court's invitation for legislative action to protect the constitutional right against coerced 
self-incrimination" (emphasis added)). The requirement that any such alternative be 
systemic in nature is further evidenced by Miranda's express rejection of a case-by-case 
analysis of surrounding circumstances to determine voluntariness: "[W]e will not pause 
to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a 
warning given." 384 U.S. at 468. That Mr. Vos had an attorney when the detective 
appeared to interrogate him does not constitute the systemic, legislative alternative 
envisioned by the Miranda Court. 
B. Legal Authority Does Not Support the State's Argument. 
Neither the state's attempt to distinguish two on-point cases discussed in Mr. 
Vos's opening brief, nor the authority the state offers in support of establishing a per se 
rule that effectively overrules Miranda and Dickerson, is persuasive. 
1. Utah's Attempt to Distinguish. Mr. Vos's opening brief discusses two cases 
that hold the requirement of warnings is absolute, and the accused's personal right to 
receive, invoke or waive said right is unaffected by the presence of counsel: State v. 
DeWeese, 582 S.E.2d 786 (W.Va. 2003); and State v. Joseph, 128 P.3d 795 (Haw.), reh'g 
denied 128 P.3d 891 (2006). 
In DeWeese, defense counsel was present with the defendant when it was agreed 
the defendant would take a polygraph examination. See id., 582 S.E.2d at 797. There, as 
here, counsel told police they need not give his client the Miranda warnings prior to the 
examination. Id. The state court of last resort addressed two legal issues in DeWeese that 
also apply to this case. 
The first legal issue is whether counsel's presence obviates the need for Miranda 
warnings. DeWeese, 582 S.E.2d at 795. Mr. Vos's opening brief, pp. 46-47, details the 
court's reasoning and ultimate holding: "[W]e hold that prior to giving a polygraph 
examination, the police must inform the defendant of his Miranda rights even though 
defense counsel is present in the room with the defendant when a polygraph examination 
is about to be given." Id. at 797. 
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In the case on review, the state attempts to distinguish DeWeese because counsel in 
that case was not actually sitting at the defendant's side throughout the entire 
interrogation, whereas Mr. Bucher was present when Mr. Vos gave a statement. 
However, as noted in the DeWeese holding (quoted immediately above), the critical time 
is when the attorney's presence just prior to interrogation leads to the failure to warn 
against self-incrimination. The Miranda warnings must be read before interrogation, 
regardless of what follows after. That is when fundamental constitutional rights are 
observed or ignored, invoked or waived. Thus, in both DeWeese and this case, the critical 
point was when counsel and police were discussing the defendant's imminent 
interrogation. In both DeWeese and in this case, counsel and client were side-by-side at 
this critical juncture. In neither was the attorney's subsequent presence relevant.7 
The second legal issue addressed in DeWeese is whether, when counsel 
purportedly waives the actual reading of the Miranda warnings on a defendant's behalf, a 
valid waiver of rights may occur thereafter. 582 S.E.2d at 796. In DeWeese, just prior to 
the interrogation, "[d]efense counsel indicated the warnings did not have to be given." Id. 
The DeWeese court reasoned that the Miranda warnings are mandatory even when 
counsel is present, and absent said warnings, Miranda bars consideration of 
circumstantial evidence to establish a defendant's understanding of the rights against self-
7
 Moreover, the DeWeese court framed the legal issue in terms more broadly applicable to 
a variety of situations - as appellate courts are wont to do. Thus the opinion's section 
heading frames the issue as follows: "Presence of counsel during polygraph 
interrogation." 582 S.E.2d at 795. Its preliminary holding similarly assumes counsel's 
presence: "Likewise, Miranda does not stand for the proposition that a warning 
regarding the privilege against self-incrimination is not required when counsel is present 
at an interrogation." Id. (emphasis in original). 
incrimination. DeWeese, 582 S.E.2d at 796-97. As a result, the court held that "while a 
defendant may waive the rights articulated under the Miranda warnings, a defendant 
cannot, as a matter of law, waive the reading of the Miranda rights." Id. at 797. 
As with the first holding, this one applies to the case on review. Counsel's 
presence after counsel has waived the actual reading of the warnings is irrelevant to the 
holding that, in effect, a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of rights cannot occur 
following counsel's purported waiver of the reading of the warnings. Put simply, a valid 
waiver may not, as a matter of law, occur unless the warnings are first given. 
The state attempts to avoid the holding of the second on-point opinion, State v. 
Joseph, by claiming it was decided on state constitutional grounds, not federal. The court 
in Joseph held, "The presence of an attorney does not constitute an implied waiver of the 
right to remain silent," and, therefore, "the police had an obligation to advise [the 
defendant] that he had the right to remain silent." 128 P.3d at 811. The Joseph court did 
indeed rely upon the Hawai'i constitution, art. I § 10; and, the Hawai'i court has 
interpreted § 10 more broadly than its federal Fifth Amendment counterpart. State v. 
Nelson, 748 P.2d 365, 369 (Haw. 1987). However, this expansion has occurred in very 
narrow and well-defined circumstances. For example, whereas federal post-Miranda 
precedent allows statements extracted in violation of Miranda to be used to impeach a 
defendant's testimony, the Hawai'i constitution mandates that the statement remain 
inadmissible. State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 662 (Haw. 1971). Santiago was extended 
to exclude un-Mirandized statements from sentencing proceedings in State v. Valera, 848 
P.2d 376, 382 (Haw. 1993). In Criminal Procedure Rights under the Hawai'i 
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Constitution Since 1992, 18 U. Haw. L. Rev., 683, 691-97 (1996), such deviations from 
federal self-incrimination precedent are noted, and none relate in any way to the holding 
in Joseph that requires Miranda warnings even in the presence of counsel. 
Absent such recognized deviations, the rule in Hawai'i is to follow the "seminal" 
decision of Miranda: "[W]hen claims of Miranda violations are advanced, we are 
constrained to seek primary guidance from precepts enunciated in the seminal decision, 
which have been incorporated into Article I, § 7 [since redesignated as § 10] of our 
constitution, and our cases rather than from later federal decisions like Harris v. New 
York [401 U.S. 222 (1971) (admitting un-Mirandized statements to impeach defendant's 
testimony)]." State v. Russo, 681 P.2d 553, 559 (Haw. 1984). 
Not surprising, therefore, the portion of Joseph relevant to the case on review cites 
Miranda, and quotes from it at length, no fewer than three times. Joseph, 128 P.3d at 
810-11. It cites and quotes from DeWeese, supra. Joseph at 810. It cites two other U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions, and one from a California state court. Id. at 811. Not once 
does it rely on a case from, or a non-federal precedent established by, a Hawai'i court or 
compelled by the Hawai'i constitution. The Joseph holding provides persuasive 
interpretation of federal law, not state law. 
2. Utah's Authority. Utah's authority cannot withstand Dicker son *s affirmation 
of the mandatory nature of the Miranda warnings, and its rejection of a totality of 
circumstances analysis from which voluntariness might be divined. Supra, § A. 
Significantly, only one of the published opinions offered by the state issued after 
the 2000 issuance of Dickerson. That was Smith v. State, 832 So.2d 92 (Ala.Crim.App. 
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2001). There, the court found circumstances such as the presence of counsel, and the 
defendant's initial exercise of the right to call a lawyer before speaking to police, to be 
indicative of voluntariness, and thus "a fully effective equivalent" to the warnings. Id. at 
98 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (emphasis removed)). 
The Smith opinion, however, mentions neither Dicker son, nor its definitive 
rejection of a totality of circumstances analysis focused upon voluntariness. Also not 
mentioned was Miranda's prohibition of relying upon circumstantial evidence in lieu of 
the warnings to establish voluntariness. E.g., 384 U.S. at 468-69. The Miranda and 
Dickerson invitation for systemic legislative alternatives to the mandatory warnings was 
not mentioned. E.g., Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440 ("the Constitution would not preclude 
legislative solutions that differed from the prescribed Miranda warnings but which were 
'at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence. . . .'" (quoting 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467)). 
The state court erred in deciding Smith. Other decisions that rely upon 
circumstances such as the presence of counsel to forgive the failure to give the warnings 
are similarly flawed, and have been effectively overruled by Dickerson, 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel provided ineffective assistance leading up to the custodial interrogation. 
The statement made during the interrogation was taken in violation of rights against self-
incrimination. The statement was used to great effect by the prosecution at trial. Its 
admission greatly restricted the defendant's strategic options. The trial court erred when 
10 
it denied Mr. Vos's motion to suppress the statement. The conviction should be reversed, 
and a new trial granted at which the statement may not be used to incriminate Mr. Vos. 
DATED this 27th day of October, 2006. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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INTRODUCTION 
Aris's own employees testified without contradiction or dispute that Aris ceased all 
business operations on January 4, 2002, fired all of its employees, closed its doors and 
then on January 7, 2002, turned over possession of the Premises to the independent 
contractor doctors to run their own business on the Premises. Aris never again sought to 
occupy the Premises and, of course, had no reason to do so. Aris simply wanted to 
remove its equipment from the Premises. In fact, when Aris's Richard Enright 
("Enright") came to Salt Lake City on January 22, 2002 to remove Aris's personal 
property, the Doctors were still operating their business on the Premises and continued to 
do so for a few weeks thereafter. Aris never contended that it suffered damages because 
of its inability to occupy the Premises and no such damages were awarded. Instead, the 
only damages sought and awarded were for depreciation of the personal property, 
physical damage to the personal property and missing personal property. It is respectfully 
submitted that the court of appeals erred in affirming the award of treble damages for this 
personal property damage. 
IL 
ARGUMENT 
A. WASATCH AND JDJ HAVE MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE AND 
PROPERLY PRESERVED BELOW THEIR ARGUMENT CONCERNING 
VACATING OF THE PREMISES, 
Aris repeats in its brief the unsuccessful arguments it made to the court of appeals 
that Wasatch and JDJ have failed to marshal the evidence and to preserve below their 
argument concerning Aris's vacating of the Premises.1 The record, however, 
demonstrates that Wasatch and JDJ have indeed marshaled the evidence and did preserve 
their argument below. 
1. Wasatch and JDJ Marshaled the Evidence. 
As it did before the court of appeals. Aris incorrectly argues that Wasatch and JDJ 
have failed to marshal the evidence. Aris wholly fails, however, to recite a single piece of 
evidence that was supposedly not marshaled or dispute with citations to the record any of 
the evidence recited in Petitioners' Brief. This failure is not surprising because all of the 
evidence recited in Petitioners' Brief comes from the testimony of Aris's own witnesses 
1
 Ironically, as discussed later in this brief [pp. 8-10], Aris also raises for the very first 
time an argument not raised before the court of appeals, i.e., that Wasatch and JDJ failed to raise 
before the court of appeals or the trial court their contention that treble damages cannot be 
awarded for damage to personal property. 
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upon which Aris relied at trial or upon the stipulation of facts executed by the parties. 
[See R. 210-216] Indeed, all of the facts which Aris sets forth in its brief are contained in 
Petitioners' Brief, but are stated in Petitioner's Brief in even more detail most favorably 
to Aris. 
For example, Aris argues that Wasatch and JDJ have failed to marshal the 
evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Aris did not vacate the Premises prior to 
January 22, 2002. Aris has been unable, however, to point to one piece of evidence not 
contained in Petitioners' Brief. As stated above, Aris's own witnesses, Enright and his 
boss, Kathleen Soto ("Soto"), testified without contradiction that Aris ceased all business 
operations and terminated all its employees on January 4, did not pay rent and then turned 
over possession to the independent contractor Doctors to operate their own business on 
January 7. [R. 526 at 38-39; 527 at 234-237] Enright further testified that when he came 
to Salt Lake City on January 22, he wanted to remove the equipment from the Premises. 
[R. 526 at 41-43] Aris did not demand that the Doctors who were then in possession of 
the Premises vacate the Premises and Aris made no effort to reoccupy the Premises. Soto 
likewise testified that she told Wasatch's Dennis Peacock ("Peacock") that Aris was 
entitled to remove its equipment before surrendering the Premises. [R. 527 at 246-248] 




2. Wasatch and JDJ Preserved Below Their Argument That Aris Vacated on 
January 4, 2002. 
Aris argues that Wasatch and JDJ failed to preserve at trial the argument that Aris 
vacated on January 4, 2002 and then misleadingly cites two alternative arguments raised 
by Wasatch and JDJ below with respect to vacating of the Premises. Once again, this 
argument is not faithful to the record. Wasatch and JDJ repeatedly argued before the trial 
court that Aris either vacated the Premises on January 4 or at least by February 9 when the 
Doctors vacated. For example: 
(a) Wasatch and JDJ contended in the Pretrial Order that Aris unilaterally 
terminated the Lease on January 4 and had vacated the Premises more than five days prior 
to January 22, 2002, which was the date on which Aris contended the forcible detainer 
occurred. [R. 169-170 & 176] 
(b) Wasatch and JDJ argued in their Trial Brief that Aris shut down its office and 
terminated all of its employees on January 4, allowed the Doctors to take possession of 
the Premises and failed to pay the January rent. [R. 219] Wasatch and JDJ argued that 
Aris's own testimony demonstrated that the Doctors - - not Aris - - were in possession of 
the Premises on January 22, 2002 and that since Aris had terminated all its employees on 
January 4, Aris was not in possession after that date. [R. 239-231] 
(c) In their closing arguments at trial, Wasatch and JDJ again argued that Aris 
vacated the Premises on January 4 when it terminated its employees and closed its offices: 
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"The evidence at trial revealed that January 4, 2002 was the last day Aris was in 
peaceable possession of the premises . . . . Aris was not in peaceable possession on that 
date [January 22, 2002] - the terminated doctors were in possession at that time." [R. 305] 
[See also R. 529 at 558-559 & 577] 
Indeed, in his opening statement, Aris's own counsel told Judge Lewis that Aris 
shut down its business on the Premises on January 4, 2002 and that thereafter the 
independent contractor Doctors conducted their own business on the Premises. [R. 526 at 
19-20]2 Beyond that, the Statement of Stipulated Facts executed by the parties prior to 
trial indicates the same thing. [R. 212-213,lfl[17-20] 
In fact, the uncontradicted testimony of Aris's own witnesses at trial was that when 
Enright attempted to remove the equipment on January 22, Wasatch's Peacock refused on 
the basis that Aris had abandoned the Premises. [R. 526 at 44-45; R. 415, Finding No. 
27] 
Clearly, Wasatch and JDJ raised at trial their argument that Aris vacated the 
Premises on January 4. 
2
 If Aris is attempting to argue that Aris did not vacate because the Doctors' occupancy 
constituted occupancy by Aris, this argument does not assist its case. If such a legally baseless 
argument were accepted, Aris necessarily continued in occupancy of the Premises on January 22 
when Enright attempted to remove the personal property because at that time the Doctors were 
undeniably still in possession of the Premises using the equipment [see Finding of Fact No. 90]. 
Thus, there could not have been a forcible detainer of real estate on January 22 when Wasatch 
and JDJ refused to consent to Enright's removing the personal property, as found by the trial 
court and affirmed by the court of appeals. 
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3. Whether Aris Vacated the Premises on January 4 Is Properly Before This 
Court. 
Aris narrowly construes this Court's order granting certiorari to preclude the 
argument raised by Wasatch and JDJ that treble damages cannot be awarded because Aris 
had already vacated the Premises weeks before Wasatch and JDJ refused to allow Aris to 
remove its personal property. The Order states that the issue to be determined is: 
"Whether damages awarded for loss, damage, and depreciation to personal property may 
be trebled pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10(3)." The determination of that issue 
obviously has to be made based upon the facts of this particular case. Wasatch and JDJ 
have argued that treble damages cannot be awarded for damage to personal property in 
any circumstance but that at the very least treble damages cannot be awarded for personal 
property where, as in the present case, the tenant vacated the Premises weeks before the 
tenant was not allowed to remove the personal property. This issue is properly before the 
Court. 
B. TREBLE DAMAGES FOR CONVERSION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 
ARE NOT RECOVERABLE UNDER THE FORCIBLE DETAINER STATUTE, 
1. Wasatch and JDJ Preserved This Argument Below. 
Aris argues for the very first time that Wasatch and JDJ failed to raise before the 
court of appeals or the trial court the contention that treble damages under the forcible 
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detainer statute cannot be awarded for damage to personal property. Aris made no such 
argument before the court of appeals and this Court should, therefore, refuse to consider 
the argument. See, Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101,1J30, 16 P.3d 1233. Moreover, the 
record disposes of this argument. 
First, Wasatch and JDJ clearly raised this argument before the court of appeals 
both in their opening brief and their reply brief. [See Appellants' Brief at 35-36; 
Appellants' Reply Brief at 9, excerpts of which are attached hereto as Addenda A&B] For 
example, Wasatch and JDJ argued in their opening brief before the court of appeals: 
Aris did not seek restitution of the Premises at trial and no such relief was 
granted. Aris did not even seek any damages on the basis it had not been 
able to occupy and use the Premises for the obvious reason that Aris had no 
use for the Premises. Aris only sought damages it claimed to have suffered 
because it had not been permitted to take its Equipment from the Premises. 
The treble damages penalty provided by the forcible detainer statute 
is a drastic remedy to discourage landlords from forcibly dispossessing 
tenants of their possession of real property. The statute should be strictly 
construed. [Citations omitted] A landlord's act in withholding a tenant's 
personal property is distinct from the act of forcibly detaining real property 
a tenant is occupying. A tenant is relegated to an action for conversion and 
replevin with respect to personal property. The forcible detainer statute 
simply does not apply to a landlord's claimed wrongful withholding of 
personal property, especially after a tenant has vacated and abandoned the 
premises. The imposition of the treble damages penalty would be even 
more incongruous in the case at bar where the parties cooperated for months 
in attempting to find a replacement tenant and Aris had no desire or ability 
to occupy the Premises. [Appellants' Brief at 35-36] 
In addition, in Appellants' Reply Brief before the court of appeals, Wasatch and 
JDJ argued: 
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Wasatch and JDJ did not unlawfully hold and keep the Premises, or do so 
by force. At most, Aris only wanted to remove its Equipment. The forcible 
detainer statute applies to the forcible detainer of real property, not to the 
withholding of personal property. [Citations omitted] 
Wasatch and JDJ then went on in their reply brief to distinguish the two cases that Aris 
cited in its brief before the court of appeals to attempt to support the imposition of treble 
damages. [Appellants' Reply Brief at 9] 
Clearly, the treble damage issue was raised by Wasatch and JDJ before the court of 
appeals. 
Aris also raises for the first time its argument that the treble damage argument was 
not preserved in the trial court. Even if Aris could raise this new argument, Wasatch and 
JDJ clearly did preserve the treble damages issue before the trial court. [See, e.g., R. 401-
402, Ifflc and e;R. 403,^5] 
For example, in its objections to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment, Wasatch and JDJ argued that §78-36-10 only applied to the forcible 
detainer of real property, not personal property. [R. 401, J^c] They further argued that 
"[s]ince the elements of the forcible detainer statute were not met the trebling of damages 
is not appropriate . . . . Only the damages set forth in §78-36-10(2)(a) are eligible for 
trebling, which does not include personal property or equipment. [R. 401-402, f^e] [See 
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also R. 403, ^J5; R. 304 (the facts of the case do not qualify as a forcible detainer action 
and treble damages are not appropriate.)]3 
An issue is adequately preserved for appellate review if it is raised in time to give 
the trial court an opportunity to rule on the issue. Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App. 367, 
U17, 38 P.3d 307. In James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987), the court 
stated that "[a] matter is sufficiently raised if it has been submitted to the trial court and 
the trial court has had the opportunity to make findings of fact or law." In Peirce v. 
Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ^[16, 994 P.2d 193, this Court held that the appellant adequately 
preserved issues in the trial court by raising them in a memorandum submitted to the trial 
court before it issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the case at bar, 
Wasatch and JDJ plainly raise the issue of treble damages with respect to personal 
property before the trial court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, the 
issue was preserved for appeal. 
3
 In this connection, it should be noted that Aris's contention that it was entitled to 
recover treble damages with respect to the personal property damage was not raised until late in 
the game. In its Amended Complaint, Aris only claimed generally that it had "suffered damages, 
and continues to suffer damages" as a result of the forcible detainer of the Premises and then 
sought treble damages with respect to those unspecified damages. [R. 33,1H[29 & 30] Aris did 
not allege personal property damage by virtue of the forcible detainer. The only personal 
property damage alleged was in the Fourth Claim for Relief for conversion. [R. 34, TflJ37 thru 39] 
Aris did not seek treble damages with respect to the personal property damages alleged in its 
conversion claim. Nor in its trial brief did Aris expressly contend that it was entitled to treble 
damages for damage to personal property based on violation of the forcible detainer statute. [R. 
199-200] Instead, Aris argued that it was entitled to recover the personal property damages based 
upon its conversion claim and sought to recover punitive damages. [R. 201-202] It was not until 
the last seconds of its counseFs closing argument that Aris claimed briefly in passing and without 
discussion or citation of authority that it was entitled to either treble damages or punitive 
damages with respect to the personal property damage. [R. 529 at 556] 
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2. §78-36-10(2) and (3) Do Not Provide for Trebling of Personal Property 
Damage. 
Aris argues that under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10(2), 
damages to personal property are recoverable where the landlord has forcibly detained the 
real estate and, therefore, such damages must be trebled under §78-36-10(3). To the 
contrary, §78-36-10(2) says nothing about damage to personal property. That section 
provides: 
The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the 
defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff 
from any of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is 
alleged in the Complaint and proved at trial. 
Each of these subsections relates to real estate. There is no such thing as the forcible 
detainer of personal property. A landlord's refusal to turn over possession of personal 
property is a conversion and is a distinct act from the landlord's forcible detainer of the 
real estate. 
Section 78-36-10(3) only provides that: "The judgment shall be entered against the 
defendant for the rent, [and] for three times the amount of damages assessed under 
Subsections (2) (a) through (2) (c). . . ." As demonstrated in Petitioners' Brief [p. 20], 
this treble damages penalty provision should be strictly construed. Because there is no 
express provision in §78-36-10(2) for recovery of personal property damages, §78-36-
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10(3) should be strictly construed to prohibit treble damages for damages to personal 
property. 
Such a statutory interpretation would not, of course, leave a tenant without a 
remedy where a landlord refuses to surrender possession of personal property. The tenant 
can recover compensatory damages for conversion and can also recover punitive damages 
in an appropriate case where the landlord has acted willfully and maliciously or in 
knowing or reckless disregard of a tenant's rights. Utah Code Ann. §78-18-19. In the 
case at bar, the trial court refused to award punitive damages because Wasatch and JDJ 
did not act with a knowing or reckless indifference or disregard of Aris's rights. [R. 369-
375] The trial court's refusal to award punitive damages is not surprising given the fact 
that JDJ in good faith claimed it had a right to retain the personal property based upon 
Aris's claimed abandonment of the Premises and the provisions of paragraph 20.1 of the 
Lease [Ex. 9,1J20.1; R. 526 at 41-43; R. 413; Finding No. 26] and the further fact that the 
parties were cooperating for months to attempt to lease the Premises and sell the personal 
property to a third party. [R. 527 at 164-166 & 199; R. 528 at 470-471 & Ex. 24] 
3. The Personal Property Damage Did Not Constitute Consequential 
Damages or General Damages Resulting From the Forcible Detainer, 
Judge Orme stated in his dissenting opinion that even if the personal property 
damages could be viewed as consequential damages from the forcible detainer, the 
11 
personal property damages could not be recovered because no general damages were 
recovered for the forcible detainer. Aris's response is telling. 
First, Aris argues that the personal property damages were not consequential 
damages resulting from the forcible detainer and that Wasatch and JDJ never made such 
an argument. [Aris Brief at 23-24] Wasatch and JDJ agree. Although Judge Orme was 
correct that even if the personal property damages were viewed as consequential damages 
they could not be recovered, the parties never argued the personal property damages were 
consequential damages and they clearly were not. In other words, the personal property 
damages were not suffered as a consequence of a forcible detainer of the real estate. The 
personal property damages found by the trial court were suffered as a result of the refusal 
by Wasatch and JDJ to surrender possession of the personal property to Aris, but, this fact 
augers in favor of Wasatch and JDJ.4 
Second, Aris argues that it suffered "harm, detriment, or loss sustained by reason 
of the injury" resulting from the forcible detainer of the Premises, that the personal 
property damages were the natural and proximate cause of the forcible detainer found by 
4
 Furthermore, Aris has never argued that the personal property damage constituted 
special damages resulting from the forcible detainer of the Premises. Even had Aris made such a 
contention, and even if the personal property damages were incorrectly deemed to be special 
damages, Aris did not plead special damages in the forcible detainer cause of action of its 
Amended Complaint. [R. 33] A party is required to specifically plead special damages in order to 
recover them. See, Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 162 (Utah 1991); Graham v. 
Street, 270 P.2d 456, 459 (Utah 1954). 
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the trial court so that these damages constituted general damages and that is all Aris was 
required to prove. 
This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between detainer of the real estate 
and the separate act of refusing to permit removal of the personal property. As Judge 
Orme stated in his dissenting opinion, "[i]t subverts the purpose of that long-standing 
policy favoring real estate to treble all damages in an action between a tenant and 
landlord just because forcible detainer of the leasehold is one aspect of that litigation." 
[Aris Vision Institute, Inc. v. Wasatch Property Management, Inc., 2005 UT App. 326, 
TJ36, 121 P.3d 24] The natural and proximate result of a landlord's forcible detainer of 
real estate is the tenant's loss of occupancy of the real estate. It was not the detainer of 
the real estate that caused the damages awarded Aris. It was the separate act of refusing 
to turn over the personal property. As stated earlier, Aris suffered no damage because of 
any loss of occupancy of the real estate. 
Aris argues in this regard that Judge Orme was wrong in stating that the general 
damages recoverable by a tenant for forcible detainer of real estate consist of the 
reasonable rental value of the Premises during the time they were forcibly detained. 
Without any authority, Aris argues that reasonable rental value is not the measure of 
damages because a tenant is not entitled to recover rent from the landlord. However, if a 
tenant is entitled to possession of real estate, the general measure of damages that a tenant 
suffers by being deprived of possession is the value of the possession. In turn, the value 
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of the possession of leased premises would (absent proof otherwise) presumably be the 
reasonable rental value of the real estate. That amount is what it would cost the tenant to 
lease other comparable space.5 In any event, the general damages recoverable for forcible 
detainer of real estate would not be damage to personal property. 
4. There Are No Utah Cases Holding That Treble Damages Can Be 
Recovered For Conversion of Personal Property. 
Aris incorrectly argues that Utah case law supports its position that treble damages 
under the forcible detainer statute can be awarded for conversion of personal property. 
[Aris Brief at 18-20] The cases cited by Aris do not in fact support this position. 
Aris miscites Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985) and 
Peterson v. Piatt, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (Utah 1965). These cases are not on point because 
they both involved the forcible detainer of real property where the landlord not only 
refused to allow the tenant to occupy the premises, but at the same time refused to permit 
the tenant to remove personal property. This Court simply recognized that the tenants had 
causes of action for conversion of the personal property. The Court did not hold or imply 
5
 Aris challenges Judge Orme's reliance upon Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206 (Utah 1930) 
for his general damage analysis on the basis that it was an unlawful detainer case and argues that 
Wasatch and JDJ fail to address the Forrester court's language that tC[t]he plaintiff is entitled to 
recover such damages as are the natural and proximate consequences of the unlawful detainer." 
Aris's distinction is one without a difference. And, once again, the natural and proximate cause 
of an unlawful detainer or a forcible detainer of real estate is not damage to personal property. 
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in either case that treble damages can be awarded against a landlord for conversion of the 
tenant's personal property. 
Aris cites for the first time King v. Firm, 285 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1955). King does 
not assist Aris. In King, the landlords padlocked the premises and refused to allow the 
tenant to enter to remove its personal property after the tenant had failed to pay rent. The 
tenant sued for wrongful eviction and for conversion ofits personal property. The Court 
held that the tenant had failed to prove any damages resulting from the landlords' forcible 
entry onto the Premises. No treble damages were awarded and no issue of treble damages 
was discussed. In fact, the tenant sought to separately recover on his conversion claim 
damages for the landlords' refusal to turn over the tenant's personal property. The Court 
separately discussed this issue and held that the landlords had a lien on the personal 
property for unpaid rent and therefore had not converted the personal property. Further, 
there was no conversion because there was no evidence that the landlords used the 
personal property for their own purposes. 
Similarly, Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P.2d 100 (Utah 1944), relied upon by Aris, is 
unhelpful. That case did not involve any damage to personal property. While the tenant 
was away from the premises in the middle of the winter, the landlord removed all of the 
doors. The tenant continued in possession. The Court only concluded that the landlord 
had a legal duty not to enter the premises by force, that the landlord had violated that duty 
and the tenant had suffered damages. The majority opinion did not even discuss the type 
or amount of damages involved. The Court only held the trial court had not erred in 
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awarding damages for mental anguish and humiliation without assessing other nominal or 
compensatory damages. There was no discussion as to whether these damages were 
special damages, consequential damages or general damages. 
Lastly, Aris places great reliance upon Fowler v. Setter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah App. 
1992), decided by a panel of the court of appeals of which Judge Orme was a member. 
Aris argues that in Fowler the court of appeals "upheld an award of treble damages for 
loss of and damage to personal property under the forcible detainer statute." Aris unfairly 
and inaccurately criticizes Jude Orme's opinion in the case at bar as being inconsistent 
with his decision in Fowler. [Aris Brief at 19-20] 
Aris overstates the holding in Fowler. In Fowler, the owners of a self-storage 
facility broke the lock on the tenant's unit and removed and sold the tenant's personal 
property. The single defendant at trial admitted liability and the jury awarded damages of 
$7,000. There is no discussion in the opinion of the basis for the $7,000 award and the 
award of compensatory damages was not an issue on appeal. After entry of the verdict, 
the plaintiffs moved for an award of treble damages pursuant to the forcible entry and 
detainer statute. The only objection raised by the landlord was that the tenant had failed 
to endorse the summons pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-36-8 and that failure allegedly 
barred an award of treble damages. The only issue on appeal was whether the failure to 
endorse the summons barred an award of treble damages.6 838 P.2d at 677. There was 
6
 The court of appeals did not even decide the general question of whether the forcible 
entry statute applied to an uninhabited storage facility because that issue was not before the court. 
[838P.2dat677n.3] 
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no issue before the court of appeals as to whether treble damages could be awarded for 
damage to personal property (even assuming that the $7,000 verdict was based upon 
personal property damages) and the court of appeals did not decide such an issue. 
Consequently, Aris's criticism of Judge Orme's opinion in the present case as being 
inconsistent with his opinion in Fowler is baseless. Simply put, Fowler did not consider 
or decide the issue now before this Court. No Utah case has decided this issue. 
C. EVEN IF TREBLE DAMAGES COULD OTHERWISE BE AWARDED 
FOR DAMAGE TO PERSONAL PROPERTY IN CONNECTION WITH A 
FORCIBLE DETAINER, TREBLE DAMAGES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED 
WHERE THE TENANT HAS ALREADY VACATED THE PREMISES. 
Even if, contrary to what Wasatch and JDJ argue above and in their opening brief, 
this Court concludes for some reason that when a landlord forcibly detains real estate and 
then refuses to turn over possession of the tenant's personal property that the personal 
property damage can be trebled, treble damages should not have been awarded in this 
case. 
As previously explained, the undisputed evidence from Aris's own employees - -
as recited by Aris's counsel in his opening statement and as acknowledged in the 
stipulated facts - - was that Aris went out of business, terminated its employees and shut 
its doors on January 4, 2002 and then turned over possession of the Premises to the 
Doctors to operate their own business on January 7, 2002. Although Aris argues it did 
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not vacate the Premises at that time, it does not challenge this undisputed evidence or 
recite any evidence to support the notion that it continued in possession of the Premises. 
Aris had no use for the Premises, never attempted to reoccupy the Premises and had no 
ability to do so since it had fired all of its employees. 
After Aris went out of business on January 4, at most all the evidence 
demonstrated was that commencing 18 days later, on January 22, Aris wanted to remove 
its equipment. Because Aris did not want to occupy, and could not use, the Premises, 
Aris did not suffer any damages because it did not continue to occupy the real estate; Aris 
did not seek any occupancy damages and Aris was not awarded any such damages. 
Under these circumstances, Aris was not entitled to an award of treble damages for the 
conversion of its personal property found by the trial court which occurred weeks after 
Aris had vacated the Premises. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the decision of the court 
of appeals affirming the award of treble damages should be reversed and the Judgment 
modified to eliminate the award of treble damages. 
DATED this of February, 2006. 
RICHARD D. BURBIDGE 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
Sixth, Aris had no right to recover for forcible detainer because it was not seeking 
restitution of the Premises. Under Utah Code Ann., §78-36-10(1), a judgment for forcible 
detainer "shall include an order for the restitution of the premises as provided in Section 
78-36-10.5." [Emphasis Added] See Freeway Park Bldg., 451 P.2d at 275 (the case was 
not for forcible entry or detainer because restitution of the premises was not sought, but 
was instead for the separate tort of wrongful eviction). Aris did not seek restitution of the 
Premises at trial and no such relief was granted. Aris did not even seek any damages on 
the basis it had not been able to occupy and use the Premises for the obvious reason that 
Aris had no use for the Premises. Aris only sought damages it claimed to have suffered 
because it had not been permitted to take its Equipment from the Premises. 
The treble damages penalty provided by the forcible detainer statute is a drastic 
remedy to discourage landlords from forcibly dispossessing tenants of their possession of 
real property. The statute should be strictly construed. Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 393 P.2d 
468, 470 (Utah 1964). Cf Keller v. Southwood North Medical Pavilion, 959 P.2d 102, 
108 (Utah 1998) (forcible entry statute only applies to types of property people can 
occupy). See also Gibby's Inc. v. Aylett, 615 P.2d 949, 951 (Nev. 1980). A landlord's act 
in withholding a tenant's personal property is distinct from the act of forcibly detaining 
real property a tenant is occupying. A tenant is relegated to an action for conversion and 
replevin with respect to personal property. The forcible detainer statute simply does not 
apply to a landlord's claimed wrongful withholding of personal property, especially after 
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a tenant has vacated and abandoned the premises. The imposition of the treble damages 
penalty would be even more incongruous in the case at bar where the parties cooperated 
for months in attempting to find a replacement tenant and Aris had no desire or ability to 
occupy the Premises. 
Aris argued below, and the trial court found, that in addition to forcibly detaining 
the Equipment on January 22, Wasatch and JDJ also forcibly detained the Equipment 
when Peacock changed the locks after the Doctors vacated on February 9. However, 
Aris had long before voluntarily vacated and abandoned the Premises and wrongfully 
turned possession of the Premises over to the Doctors. When the locks were changed on 
February 9, Aris had not occupied or operated a business on the Premises for over a 
month. Further, Aris did not have keys to the Premises even before the locks were 
changed so the changing of the locks did not dispossess Aris and had no effect 
whatsoever on Aris's ability to occupy the Premises. Finally, after the locks were 
changed, Aris did not request occupancy of the Premises or keys to the Premises. Aris 
was given access to the Premises any time it requested for the purpose of inspecting and 
inventorying the Equipment and showing it to prospective purchasers. [SOF Nos. 29 & 
35] 
2. Wrongful Eviction, 
Similarly, because Aris had vacated and abandoned the Premises on January 4 and 
then turned over possession of the Premises to the Doctors, thereby breaching the Lease, 
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1. Forcible Detainer. 
After Aris ceased all business operations, terminated all employees and vacated the 
Premises on January 4 and voluntarily turned over possession of the Premises to the 
doctors on January 1, Aris had no reason or desire to occupy the Premises and had no 
ability to do so. Wasatch and JDJ did not unlawfully hold and keep the Premises, or do 
so by force. At most, Aris only wanted to remove its Equipment. The forcible detainer 
statute applies to the forcible detainer of real property, not to the withholding of personal 
property.4 Utah Code Ann., §78-36-2. See Freeway Park Bldg., Inc. v. Western States 
Wholesale Supply, 451 P.2d 778, 781 (Utah 1969). 
Aris miscites Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699-700 (Utah 1985) and 
Peterson v. Piatt, 400 P.2d 507, 508 (Utah 1965), for the proposition that a landlord can 
be held liable under the forcible detainer statute for seizing a tenant's personal property 
without judicial process. [Appellee's Brief at 31 ] These cases are not on point because 
they both involved the forcible detainer of real property where the landlord also refused to 
permit the tenant to remove personal property. Further, the Supreme Court only 
recognized that the tenants had causes of action for conversion of the personal property. 
The Supreme Court did not hold or intimate in either case that treble damages can be 
awarded against a landlord for conversion of the tenant's personal property. 
4
 Aris does not appear to challenge that Wasatch and JDJ raised below the argument that 
the forcible detainer statute only applies to the forcible detainer of real property, not personal 
property. In any event, they clearly did raise this argument. [See, e.g., R. 401-402 ^|a, c & e; 
175-176; 230-231; 305-306; R. 529 at 560-561; 403 \S\ 
9 
